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In models of international trade, the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic 
goods—the Armington elasticity—determines the behavior of trade flows and international 
prices. International real business cycle models need low elasticities, in the range of 1 to 2, to 
match the quarterly fluctuations in trade balances and the terms of trade, but static applied general 
equilibrium models need high elasticities, between 10 and 15, to account for the growth in trade 
following trade liberalization.  To reconcile these contradictory findings, we construct a model in 
which cyclical fluctuations are caused by temporary shocks, as in business cycle models, but 
tariff changes are permanent.  In the model, firms do not change export status in response to 
temporary shocks, while tariff decreases induce some non-exporters to export.  In a calibrated 
model, the entry of new exporters increases the measured elasticity with respect to a tariff change 
to 6.4, while the elasticity in response to temporary shocks is 1.2. 
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A common feature of many international trade models is national product differentiation: 
countries produce and trade differentiated goods that are to some extent substitutable for 
each other.  In these models, the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign 
produced goods—the Armington elasticity, after Armington (1969)—is the critical 
parameter for determining the behavior of trade flows and international prices.  The 
importance of this parameter has manifested in two of the leading branches of 
international economics: the international business cycle literature that seeks to 
understand the high frequency fluctuations in macroeconomic aggregates, and the static 
applied general equilibrium literature that focuses on explaining the patterns of trade and 
the effects of trade policy.  These two disciplines, however, have very different views on 
the value of the Armington elasticity.  
International real business cycle (IRBC) models need small values of the 
elasticity to generate the volatility of the terms of trade and the negative correlation 
between the terms of trade and the trade balance that are found in the data.  IRBC models 
commonly use Armington elasticities around 1.5, though sensitivity analysis suggests 
values even lower than this may be appropriate.  (See for example, Backus, Kehoe and 
Kydland (1994), Zimmermann (1997), or Heathcote and Perri (2002).)  Not surprisingly, 
when empirical researchers have estimated the Armington elasticity from high frequency 
data they find small estimates that range from about 0.2 to 3.5.  In contrast, applied 
general equilibrium (GE) models need large Armington elasticities to explain the growth 
in trade volumes that result from a change in tariffs.  As shown in Yi (2003), these 
models need elasticities of 12 or 13 to generate the large growth in trade found in the 
data.  Empirical work on trade liberalizations, as well as cross country regressions 
relating trade patterns to tariff and non-tariff barriers, find Armington elasticities that 
range from about 4 to 15, similar to the ones needed in applied GE models.   
  The key to understanding these two different measurements of the Armington 
elasticity is to realize that the source of variation in the prices and quantities being 
measured is different.  The high frequency variation in the time series data is likely 
caused by transitory shocks to supply or demand.  These are exactly the transitory shocks 
2 used in the business cycle models that need small Armington elasticities.  Trade 
liberalization, however, can be thought of as a permanent change.  When agents react 
differently to temporary and permanent changes, the measured Armington elasticities will 
differ.  
In this paper we show that a model combining elements of the real business cycle 
and the applied GE frameworks can reproduce both the low elasticities estimated from 
the time series data and the high elasticities implied by the growth in trade following a 
decrease in tariffs.  The model features an entry cost of exporting and heterogeneous 
firms, as in Melitz (2003), but adds aggregate productivity shocks, as found in the IRBC 
models of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994) and Stockman and Tesar (1995).  As in 
Melitz (2003), entry costs interact with firm level heterogeneity to partition firms into 
exporters and non-exporters.  A firm decides whether to become an exporter by 
comparing the expected future value of exporting to the cost of entry.  If the expected 
gain from exporting is larger than the cost of entry, the firm becomes an exporter.  The 
movement of firms into and out of exporting in response to temporary changes in 
productivity or permanent changes in tariffs drives the two very different elasticities 
measured in the model.   
Since temporary changes in productivity change expected future profits from 
exporting little, few firms choose to change their exporting status.  Thus, temporary 
changes in productivity tend to show up as price changes in the goods already being 
traded, and consumers substitute between goods at the low “true” elasticity specified as a 
parameter in the model.  We call this change in the amount of goods that were already 
being traded a change on the intensive margin.  When all change occurs on the intensive 
margin, as it does in most trade models, estimating the elasticity from aggregate trade 
flows will recover the true elasticity.  In our model there is a small number of firms 
entering and exiting the export market in response to productivity shocks, but the trade 
from these firms is small compared to aggregate trade.  Thus, when we estimate the 
Armington elasticity in the model in response to productivity shocks, we find small 
values that are close to the true elasticity specified by the parameters. The estimated 
elasticity is not exactly equal to the true elasticity because the price indices constructed 
for use in the estimation do not incorporate the changing set of goods being traded.  As 
3 shown in Feenstra (1994), not including these newly traded goods imparts a bias to the 
indices.  We discuss this mismeasurement and its implications in Section 6. 
In contrast, a permanent change, such as lower tariffs, raises the profit from 
exporting in all states of nature and increases the expected future gain from exporting 
more than a temporary productivity shock.  This induces more firms to begin exporting, 
resulting in large trade flows. We call the increase in trade flows from newly traded 
goods an increase on the extensive margin.  The increase in the extensive margin is the 
key to understanding the large elasticities measured in response to trade liberalization. 
Following a decrease in tariffs, trade increases for two reasons: consumers buy more of 
the goods they already import, since the delivered price is now lower, and they buy new 
imports that were not previously available.  The first kind of growth is intensive margin 
growth, while the second is extensive margin growth.  If the change in aggregate trade is 
mistakenly assumed to be all intensive margin growth, the small changes in tariffs appear 
to induce large changes in imports on the intensive margin, which implies a large 
elasticity of substitution.  When we make a similar measurement in our model after a 
decrease in tariffs, we find an Armington elasticity that is more than 3 times the true 
value.  When we shut down the extensive margin in our model, however, our measured 
elasticity is the same as the true elasticity. 
There is growing evidence that the extensive margin, which drives the central 
result of this paper, is an important facet of the data.  Empirically, Hillberry and 
McDaniel (2002) find evidence of extensive margin growth for the U.S. following the 
implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Kehoe and 
Ruhl (2002) document extensive margin growth in a study of trade liberalizations and lay 
out a simple Ricardian model to highlight the forces at work.  In a test of several firm-
level models of exporter behavior, Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2003) study data on U.S. 
manufacturing plants and find strong evidence that new plants choose to enter the export 
market as trade costs fall.
1  In a cross sectional study, Hummels and Klenow (2005) find 
that larger and richer countries have larger extensive margins.  The larger, richer, 
countries also tend to be the countries with the most liberalized trade policy.  Broda and 
                                                 
1 Bernard, Jensen et al. (2003) test the predictions of the plant-level models of Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and 
Kortum (2003), Melitz (2003), and Yeaple (2005). 
4 Weinstein (2006) document the increase in the number of imported goods available in the 
U.S. and compute an import price index, based on Feenstra (1994), which corrects for 
these newly imported goods.  They find significant gains in welfare from these new 
imports. 
Earlier theoretical work on export entry costs and uncertainty has focused on 
hysteresis in exporting.  Baldwin (1988), Baldwin and Krugman (1989), and Dixit (1989) 
show how temporary increases in profitability (they considered exchange rates) could 
increase exports as firms enter the export market, but that high levels of exports would 
persist even as exchange rates appreciated.  The firms that had incurred the sunk cost to 
export would continue to do so, even faced with a less attractive exchange rate, since they 
had already incurred the start-up cost.   
In more recent work, Melitz (2003) incorporates export entry costs into a model 
of monopolistic competition, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), in an environment with no 
aggregate uncertainty.  His analysis focuses on the reaction of an industry to changes 
caused by trade liberalization.  The model presented here has a structure of production 
similar to that in Melitz (2003), but focuses on the effects of industry structure on 
aggregate trade in the presence of aggregate uncertainty.  In Alessandria and Choi 
(2007a) export entry costs are imbedded in a standard international real business cycle 
model to study the effects of exporter entry and exit on international correlations of 
consumption and output.  They find, as do we, that the extensive margin is not important 
for aggregate quantities at business cycle frequencies.  Ghironi and Melitz (2005) model 
fixed—but not sunk—export costs, in a real business cycle model to generate endogenous 
persistent deviations from purchasing power parity.  Their models are conceptually 
similar to the one presented here, in that they involve aggregate uncertainty modeled as 
shocks to productivity.  Their analysis, however, is focused on the characteristics of 
international business cycles, while we are concerned with the different behavior of trade 
flows in response to different sources of variation.    
Empirical justification for the export entry costs that are central to this model, and 
the literature cited above, has come as the result of plant-level dynamic models of export 
entry decisions.  The seminal work in this literature is Roberts and Tybout (1997), who 
develop an econometric model of a plant’s decision to enter the export market.  Using 
5 panel data on the Colombian manufacturing sector, they reject the null hypothesis that 
entry costs are unimportant.  In a study of German plants, Bernard and Wagner (2001) 
find evidence of substantial sunk costs in export entry.  Using a detailed data set on U.S. 
manufacturing plants, Bernard and Jensen (2004) find that export entry costs are 
significant and that plant heterogeneity is important in the export decision. 
  The next section reviews the evidence on the elasticity of substitution as estimated 
by different authors using different techniques.  Section 3 lays out evidence that the 
extensive margin is active during times of policy changes, but not during business cycles.  
Section 4 presents a model of the extensive margin: firms choose whether or not to export 
in the presence of fixed costs and uncertainty about future productivity.  Section 5 
discusses computational issues and calibration of the model.  Section 6 presents the 
model results, and Section 7 concludes.   
2. Measuring Import Price Elasticities  
In this section we review previous estimates of the Armington elasticity.  Based on our 
hypothesis that transitory changes in profitability lead to different responses than 
permanent changes, we divide the literature into two subsections.  We find that studies 
that use high frequency price variation to estimate the Armington elasticity find low 
values, while studies that use data on trade barriers or data from trade liberalizations, tend 
to find much higher values.  
2.1. Incorporating Substitution into Models 
In Armington (1969), it is posited that goods produced by different countries are 
intrinsically different goods.  The utility that consumers derive from these nationally 
differentiated goods is represented by a constant elasticity of substitution utility function,  
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6 where   is the price of the good produced in the home country and  h P f P  is the price of the 
good produced in the foreign country.  It is easy to see from (2) that  () 11 σ ρ =−  is the 
elasticity of substitution between the goods.  When the two goods are differentiated by 
country of origin, as in this case, this elasticity is commonly referred to as the Armington 
elasticity.   
An alternative way of incorporating national product differentiation is to assume 
that countries produce intermediate goods that are combined to produce an aggregate 
consumption-investment good.  In these models, the feasibility condition is  
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where   is consumption,  C X  is investment,   is the intermediate good produced in the 
home country, and 
h q
f q  is the intermediate good produced in the foreign country.  When 
using this specification, the constant elasticity function on the right-hand side of (3) is 
commonly called the Armington aggregator.  Minimizing the cost of producing one unit 
of the aggregate good implies the same first order condition as (2).  
In trade models that feature imperfect competition and differentiated goods, such 
as those in Helpman and Krugman (1985), consumers are frequently modeled as having 
constant elasticity of substitution preferences over varieties of goods within an industry, 
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where  () , hj c ι  is consumption of domestically produced variety ι , and  ( ) , fj c ι  is 
consumption of the foreign produced variety in industry  j .  The set   is the set of 
varieties that the consumer has available for purchase.  Maximizing (4) subject to a 
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where  () , fj p ι′  and  () , hj p ι  are, respectively, the price of the foreign and home goods.  
For example,  ( , hj ) c ι  could be a shirt made domestically, while  () , fj c ι′ is a shirt made 
7 abroad and imported.  The empirical literature we survey below uses data collected at a 
level of aggregation higher than the “variety” level used in (5) so, it is common to write 
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where   is the aggregate amount of domestic consumption of goods in industry  , hj C j  and 
 is an aggregate price index for the domestically produced goods.   , hj P , f j C  and  , f j P  are 
similarly defined for the goods imported into the home country.  
Note that in contrast to the Armington model, goods in this specification are not 
different because they are made in different countries.  Here goods are different by their 
very nature; these are the “differentiated goods” found in models of monopolistic 
competition such as Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).  That the goods are made in different 
countries matters only to the consumer through the home bias parameter, ω .  What is the 
same about the two models, however, is the implication of the first order conditions, (2) 
and (6). These equations are the basis for the estimation of Armington elasticities.  
2.2. Estimates from Price Variation 
We begin by reviewing the Armington elasticities used in the IRBC literature.  The 
Armington elasticities used in the IRBC literature range from 0.5 to 2.0.  In Backus, 
Kehoe, and Kydland (1994) each country produces a tradable intermediate good which is 
combined using an Armington aggregator, as in (3),  to produce an aggregate 
consumption-investment good.  The authors’ baseline choice of the Armington elasticity 
is 1.5, but they perform sensitivity analysis to this parameter.  They find that the model 
with a smaller elasticity (0.5) can better account for the volatility of the terms of trade 
and the negative correlation between the terms of trade and the trade balance, than can 
the model with a larger (2.5) elasticity.  Heathcote and Perri (2002) use a similar two-
intermediate-goods environment to study business cycles under different degrees of 
financial market completeness.   Beginning with a baseline value of 1.0, they find that the 
volatility of the terms of trade, the cross-country correlation of investment, and the cross-
8 country correlation of consumption and output are closer to those in the data when lower 
values of the elasticity are used.   
In addition to the low elasticities needed for IRBC models to match the features of 
the high frequency data, low elasticities are also found when they are directly estimated 
from high frequency data on prices.  The estimating equations are derived from the first 
order conditions, such as those in (2) or (6).   Taking the logarithm of (6) yields the basic 
equation estimated by several authors, 
  () ( ) ,, ,, log log f jt h jt j j h jt f jt jt CC PP α σε = ++ , (7) 
where  , f jt C  is the real quantity of imports in industry  j ,   is the real consumption of 
domestically produced goods in industry 
, hj t C
j , and   and  , hj t P , f jt P  are price indices for 
domestic sales and imports.  To estimate this equation, quarterly data on imports and 
domestic consumption of the industry’s good, as well as data on the relative prices is 
collected.  Typically, the price data take the form of a unit price index for imports, and a 
producer price index for domestic goods.  Reinert and Roland-Holst (1992) estimate an 
equation similar to (7) for 163 industries and find elasticities that range from 0.02 to 3.49, 
with an average value of 0.91.  Blonigen and Wilson (1999) estimate elasticities for 146 
sectors, and find an average elasticity of 0.81, with a maximum value of 3.52.  Similar 
estimates are found in Reinert and Shiells (1993) and in the short run elasticities reported 
in Gallaway, McDaniel and Rivera (2003).   The elasticities found by estimating (7) on 
high frequency time series data are fairly robust.  Adjustments have been made for, 
among other things, serially correlated errors, differing levels of aggregation, and 
seasonal effects.  The elasticities estimated using these expanded techniques still find low 
values.   
  The most complete study of trade elasticities to date is Broda and Weinstein 
(2006), in which the authors estimate tens of thousands of elasticities for the United 
States.  Using a theoretical model with three tiers of goods: a composite imported good, 
imported goods, indexed by , and varieties of a good,  g gc m , where   indexes the country 
of origin, the authors extend the methodology developed in Feenstra (1994) and estimate 
a demand equation for varieties,  
c
  () ( ) ( ) 1, 1, log 1 log tt g c t g t g tt g c t g c t sp ϕ σ −− Δ= − − Δ ε + , (8) 
9  where  gc s  is the expenditure share of variety   in good  ,  gc g gt ϕ is a random effect, and 
 is the difference operator.  The demand equation is estimated with an export supply 
equation to allow for upward sloping supply curves, 
Δ
  () ( ) 1, 1, log log tt g c t g t gtt g c t g c t ps ψ ω −− Δ= + Δ δ + . (9) 
These equations are differenced with respect to a reference county, eliminating the 
random effects, and the resulting system of equations is estimated using a general method 
of moments estimator.  Identification comes from the cross country variation in prices 
(the between estimator). 
  Broda and Weinstein (2006) define a 10-digit Harmonized System code or 7-digit 
Tariff System of the U.S.A. code from a particular country as a variety.  When defining a 
good as a HS code, they report good specific elasticities with a median value of 3.10.  
The median elasticity is higher than the others found in this section, but it is important to 
note that unlike the other studies in the section, the elasticities are restricted to be greater 
than one.  Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate some large elasticities as well—the 
maximum elasticity in the HS data is 4302.6—but the estimated values vary with the 
good type in ways one might expect.  For example, goods that are commodities have 
higher elasticities than goods that are considered a priori differentiated. 
  What is clear, from both the calibration based literature and the empirical 
estimates, is that the cyclical fluctuations in prices and quantities seem to imply that the 
Armington elasticity is small.  We now turn to the estimates of the Armington elasticity 
that use data from trade liberalizations to identify the elasticity of substitution.    
2.3. Estimates from Trade Policy and Geography  
In this subsection we consider estimates of the Armington elasticity that are derived from 
variation in geography and tariffs.  In contrast to the high frequency data used in the 
studies above, the main sources of variation considered in these studies are permanent in 
nature.  In the studies of specific trade liberalization episodes, the trade policy being 
analyzed is typically not a temporary policy to be reversed later.  In the cross section 
regressions, cross-country variation in trade barriers, such as transportation costs, tends to 
be permanent.  Though per-mile transportation costs may be falling, distances between 
countries are not; the relative transportation cost of importing a good from two different 
10 countries stays about the same.  The heterogeneity in bilateral trade policy, which is also 
an important source of variation, may change, but again, the changes are likely 
permanent.  
Before turning to the empirical estimates, we consider the model-based 
“estimates” of the Armington elasticity.  Applied general equilibrium models have been 
used in the past to predict the consequences of trade policy, but these models can also be 
used ex post to study trade flows.  This method uses the observed change in trade flows 
and tariff rates to back out values for the elasticity of substitution between foreign and 
domestic goods.  Yi (2003) performs this exercise for three workhorse models: a 
Ricardian model, as in Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977), a model with 
differentiated goods as in Krugman (1980), and a model with an Armington aggregator, 
as in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994).  He finds that the Armington elasticity needs 
to be at least 12 for any of the models to generate the observed trade flows in response to 
the observed tariffs rates.  Similarly, in a “calibration-as-estimation” exercise, Anderson, 
Balistreri, Fox, and Hillberry (2005) find that the Armington elasticities needed to match 
the world bilateral trade pattern are, on average, 17.  
When Armington elasticities are econometrically estimated from trade policy 
episodes, the results support the high elasticities found in the model-based exercises like 
Yi (2003).  Elasticities derived from natural experiments, like policy changes, are 
typically computed from the changes in imports and domestic consumption given the 
observed changes in tariff rates.  Comparisons are made over two points in time, typically 
several years, as liberalization is usually a gradual process.  A simple version of the 
calculation is 
  () ,, log log 1
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where τ  is the ad valorem tariff rate and  , tt T + Δ  is the  year T − difference operator.  The 
subscript  j  indexes the industry; the equation specified in (10) can be estimated as a 
panel.  Calculating the elasticity this way assumes that the change in tariff is the only 
change in relative prices, although various adjustments are typically made to control for 
other sources of variation.   
11 Using this methodology, Clausing (2001) finds a price elasticity of 9.6 in a study 
of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
2  Head and Ries (2001) find elasticities that 
range from 7.9 to 11.4 in a regression relating trade shares to both tariff and non-tariff 
barriers between Canada and the United States.  In a detailed study of NAFTA and the 
Canada U.S. Free Trade Agreement that features data on thousands of goods, Romalis 
(2007) estimates elasticities that range between 4 and 13.  These estimates are based on 
the substantial variation in tariff rates across partners and goods that is a feature of the 
disaggregated data.  
  Further evidence of high Armington elasticities can be found in cross sectional 
studies, where the identification comes from differences across countries, such as 
distance or tariff levels.  In a model of economic geography with explicit consideration of 
transportation costs, Hummels (2001) uses data from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, New 
Zealand, Paraguay, and the United States to estimate the elasticity of substitution between 
varieties in a model with preferences similar to (4).  The estimation produces elasticities 
ranging from 3 to 8.  Baier  and  Bergstrand (2001) estimate a panel model over 16 
OECD countries and find that trade flows are about 16 times more responsive to changes 
in tariffs than changes in relative prices.   
In this section we have seen how estimates of the Armington elasticity differ 
considerably when the underlying source of variation differs. Elasticities measured by 
studying the high frequency changes in prices and quantities are likely capturing 
responses to transitory shocks, and range between 0.2 and 3.5.  Estimates based on 
changes in trade policy, other trade costs, or cross country variation are likely capturing 
the response of trade flows to more permanent factors, and usually range between 4 and 
15.  The large differences in these estimates suggest that trade flows are more sensitive to 
permanent changes then to temporary shocks.   
3. When is the Extensive Margin Important? 
The estimates surveyed above imply that different kinds of variations in import prices 
drive different measured elasticities.  In the model presented below, we use the extensive 
                                                 
2 In models based on (4), the elasticity of substitution and the price elasticity of demand are equal. In 
models with a finite number of varieties the price elasticity converges to the elasticity of substitution as the 
number of varieties approaches infinity.  
12 margin to generate the different response to temporary and permanent changes.  In this 
section we review the evidence on when the extensive margin is most important.  Kehoe 
and Ruhl (2002) use disaggregated trade flow data to determine when the extensive 
margin is important for trade growth.  Using data on about 800 4-digit Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) codes, they construct a set of least traded 
goods—goods with no trade plus goods with very little trade—and study how this set of 
goods grows during trade liberalization episodes and over the business cycle.   
To construct the set of least traded goods for a particular trade flow, they order the 
SITC codes by the value of trade in a base year.  They cumulate the ordered codes to 
form 10 sets of codes, each representing one-tenth of total exports.  The first set is 
constructed, starting with the smallest codes, by adding codes to the set until the sum of 
their values reaches one-tenth of total export value.  The next set is formed by summing 
the smallest remaining codes until the value of the set reaches one-tenth of total export 
value.  This procedure produces 10 sets of codes, each representing one-tenth of total 
trade in the base year.  The first set consists of the least traded goods: the codes with the 
smallest export values, including all the SITC codes with zero trade value.  If goods that 
were previously not traded, or traded very little, begin being traded this will show up in 
the data as growth in the set of least traded goods, that is, growth on the extensive 
margin.  
3.1. Trade Liberalization and the Extensive Margin 
Kehoe and Ruhl (2002) find substantial growth in the set of least traded goods following 
trade liberalization.  As an example, consider the North American Free Trade 
Agreement’s impact on exports from Mexico to Canada, the results of which are 
reproduced in Figure 1.  Taking 1989 as the base year, the goods are partitioned into 10 
sets: each bar in Figure 1 represents a set of goods that makes up 10 percent of total trade 
in 1989.  The number above the bar is the number of SITC codes in the set.  The first bar 
is the set of least traded goods: 736.6 of the least traded SITC codes that account for 10 
percent of trade in 1989.  The height of the bar represents the share of those same goods 
in 1989.  The extensive margin growth is striking; the set of goods that accounted for 10 
percent of trade in 1989 accounts for 23 percent of trade in 1999.  Further evidence of the 
impact of the NAFTA can be seen in Figure 2.  This figure focuses on the timing of the 
13 growth of the extensive margin.  For each year, the least traded goods’ share of total 
Mexican exports to Canada is plotted.  The extensive margin decreases slightly prior to 
the NAFTA and grows as the agreement is implemented.  Kehoe and Ruhl (2002) study 
various liberalization episodes and find extensive margin growth to be a robust feature of 
the data.    
3.2. Business Cycles and the Extensive Margin   
Kehoe and Ruhl (2002) show that while the extensive margin is active during trade 
liberalization, it is does not change much over the business cycle.  Take the United 
States’ exports to the United Kingdom from 1989-1999 as an example; the U.K. is one of 
the top trading partners of the U.S. during this time period.  Trade policy between the two 
countries did not change significantly, but the period encompasses both a recession and 
an expansion.  As in the previous example, trade between the U.S. and the U.K. is 
partitioned into 10 sets of goods.  The results are plotted in Figure 3.  The least traded 
goods, which make up 10 percent of trade in 1989, make up 11 percent of trade in 1999.  
In fact, the there is little change in the composition of goods being traded; no set of goods 
changes by more than four percentage points.  In Figure 4 the evolution of the least 
traded goods is plotted.  While there is some variation in the share of trade accounted for 
by the least traded goods, the variation is small compared to that in Figure 2.   
Estimates of the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods 
show that trade flows are more sensitive to permanent changes, like trade liberalization 
than they are to cyclical fluctuations.  The data from disaggregated trade flows reveals 
that the extensive margin is active during these trade policy episodes, but not during 
business cycles.  In the next section we specify a model that ties these two ideas together.  
The model produces temporary changes through productivity shocks and permanent 
changes through trade policy.  It is then possible to study the effects of temporary and 
permanent changes on trade flows and the extensive margin.  
4. Model 
The model is designed to incorporate the major elements of standard applied general 
equilibrium models into an environment with aggregate uncertainty as in IRBC models.  
Consumers derive utility from consuming differentiated goods sold in markets 
14 characterized by monopolistic competition.  The economy departs from the standard 
framework by requiring firms to pay a one-time entry cost before exporting and by 
subjecting the economy to aggregate productivity shocks. This structure of production is 
similar to Melitz (2003), but here the economy is subject to uncertainty about future 
productivity.  These elements create an economy in which firms respond differently to 
temporary shocks to productivity, than they do to permanent changes in policy.  
The economy consists of two countries, denoted as home ( ) and foreign ( h f ).  
Each country is endowed with  k L  units of labor, which is the only factor of production.  
Each country produces two types of goods: a non-traded, homogeneous good,  , which 
is sold in a competitive market, and a continuum of tradable differentiated goods, indexed 
by 
q
ι , which are produced by monopolistically competitive firms.  A differentiated good 
produced in country   and consumed in country  h f  is denoted by  ()
f
h c ι .  For clarity, 
only the home country variables and maximization problems are described.  The foreign 
country faces analogous problems.   
At each date t, one of Η  possible events,  t η , occurs.  Each event is associated 
with a vector of economy-wide productivity shocks,  ( ) ( ) ( ) , th t f t zz z η η = , and the initial 
event  0 η  is given.  We assume η follows a stationary first-order Markov chain with 
transition matrix  .  An element of  Λ Λ, the probability of event η′ happening tomorrow, 
given event η happened today, is  ( ) t 1 pr t ηη λ ηη + ′η η ′ = == .   
A key feature of this economy is that differentiated good firms are heterogeneous 
in their productivity and in the entry cost they must pay in order to export.  A firm is 
indexed by its idiosyncratic productivity, φ∈F , its entry cost, κ ∈K, and whether or 
not it is an exporter.  The firm’s values of φ  and κ  are constant for the life of the firm.  
A firm is an exporter if and only if it has paid the entry cost κ .  The distribution of firms 
that begin the period as exporters is represented by a measure over () , φ κ ,  () , hx μ φκ , 
which has support  .  Plants that begin the period as non-exporters are tracked by a 
similar measure, 
× FK
( , hd ) μ φκ .  Since firms have market power, they will choose their prices 
taking into account the consumer’s demand function.  In order to compute the 
15 household’s demand, the firm needs to know which firms are selling in a market, so the 
measures over exporters and non-exporters are state variables.  Denoting the vector of 
firm distributions as  ( ,,, hd hx fd fx) μ μμμμ = , the aggregate state variables for the 
economy can be represented by ( ) , η μ .  The agents in the economy take as given the 
laws of motion for μ , 
( ) ( ) , ,   , hd hd , μ φκ ′ =Μ φκημ (11) 
( ) ( ) ,, ,   , hx hx μφ κ ′ =Μ
)
φ κ ημ, 
with similar laws of motion for the distributions in the foreign country.  For notational 
simplicity, define Μ  as the law of motion over the distribution of all firms,  (
( ) ,   μ′ =Μ ημ. (12) 
4.1. Households 
The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical households.  It is assumed that 
each household owns an equal share in all domestic firms in operation.  We do not allow 
countries to borrow and lend with each other, but within a country, households can trade 
a complete set of Arrow Securities.  Given these assumptions, and the homotheticity of 
preferences, the households can be represented by a stand-in household.  The household’s 






















h q , (13)   
where  ()
j
k c ι  is the differentiated good ι  made in country  and consumed in country  k j .  





k p ι .  Imports are subject to an ad valorem tariff, τ , which is modeled 
as an iceberg transportation cost for simplicity.  Important objects in this model are the 
sets of good available for consumption in the period,  ( )
h
h μ Ι  and  ( )
h
f μ Ι .   ()
h
h μ Ι  is the set 
of goods produced in the home country that are available to consume in the home 
country.  Since firms do not pay an entry cost to sell to the domestic market, this set is the 
entire set of domestically produced goods, regardless of the state of the economy.  The 
16 set of imported varieties that are available,  ( )
h
f μ Ι , will generally be a strict subset of the 
varieties produced in the foreign country.  This set consists only of the goods whose firms 
have paid the entry cost to set up exporting operations.  This set of varieties varies with 
the state of the economy.   




























whose price can be found by minimizing the cost of producing one unit of  ,  h C
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Pp c d p
ιι
ιμ ιμ
η μι ι ι ι η μ τ
∈Ι ∈Ι ∫∫ η μ =+ ι + ι , (15) 
subject to  .  Solving this minimization problem yields the familiar expressions for 
the price of the composite good, 
1 h C =



























⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ∫∫ ι τ =+ , (16) 
demand functions for each of the differentiated varieties produced in the home country, 
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and demand functions for each of the differentiated varieties produced in the foreign 
country, 

















= ⎟ ⎟ + ⎝⎠

ιημ
⎜ ⎜ . (18) 
  The stand-in household in each country inelastically supplies labor to firms and 
chooses consumption of the domestically produced varieties, the available imported 
varieties, and the non traded good to maximize utility.  The household’s value function 
can be written as 
17   , (19)  () ( ) () ( ) ( ) ,m a x l o g 1 l o g , hh WC q W ηη
η
ημ γ γ β η μ λ ′
′
⎛⎞
′′ =+ − + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑
subject to the budget constraint, 
  () () ( ) ( ) ()( ,, , , hh h q h h h PC p qQ B L B
η
) η μ ημ ηημ ηη ημ η
′
′′ ++ = + Π + ∑  (20) 
and the laws of motion over the distribution of firms, (12).  
The price of the non-traded good in the home country is  hq p .  Aggregate profits, 
, are returned to the household, and the home country wage is normalized to 1.  As the 
households within a country are identical, there will be no borrowing and lending within 
the country. The existence of these securities, however, allows us to compute 
h Π

















so that firms value future profits in a consistent way.  
4.2. Differentiated Good Producers 
There is a continuum of differentiated good firms indexed by their idiosyncratic 
productivities,  φ , and export entry costs, κ .  A firm’s marginal cost of production 
consists of two parts: the idiosyncratic, non-stochastic productivity, φ , and the economy 
wide, stochastic productivity,  ( ) h z η .  The production function for a firm of type ( ) , φ κ  
in aggregate state ( , ) η μ  is linear, 
  ( ) ( ) ,,, h y zl φ κ ημ ηφ = . (22) 
When a firm chooses to begin exporting, it must pay the entry cost, κ .  This cost must be 
paid before the realization of η and can not be recovered afterward.  After paying this 
entry cost, the firm faces no further costs associated with exporting.    
An incumbent firm enters the period as either an exporter or a non-exporter. After 
aggregate productivity is revealed, firms choose how much labor to hire and how much to 
produce.  After production, a mass of entrants, ν , arrives who have not paid the fixed 
cost to export. The joint distribution of idiosyncratic productivity and entry costs over 
these entrants has p.d.f.  .   At the end of the period, non-exporters decide whether to 
continue as non-exporters, or to pay 
Φ
κ  and begin exporting.  In addition, firms face an 
18 exogenous probability of death, δ .  Exporting decisions, along with the exogenous death 
of firms, determine the next period’s distributions of exporters and non-exporters,  hd μ ′ 
and  hx μ ′.  The timing of decisions and the evolution of the distributions over firms are 
displayed in Figure 5.  
The firm’s problem can be broken up into two sub-problems.  The first problem is 
a static maximization of period profits.  The second is the dynamic decision of exporter 
status.  We turn to the static problem first.  Plants are monopolistic competitors who 
choose prices to maximize profits, taken as given the aggregate price index and the wage.  
The firm realizes, however, that the household’s demand is downward sloping, and thus 
the demand functions defined in (11) and (12) appear in the firm’s problem.  For clarity 
in the firm’s dynamic problem, it is useful to define the value of maximized profits from 
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Optimization implies that firms set prices as a constant markup over marginal costs, 










== , (25) 
and determines the labor demand functions,  ( ) ,,,
h
h l φ κημ  and  ( ) ,,,
f
h l φ κημ .  Having 
defined the maximized values from the static problem, the firm’s dynamic problem is 
reduced to choosing only exporting decisions.  As there are no export continuation costs, 
an exporter will always choose to stay an exporter; monopolistic competition ensures that 
the firm always earns a positive profit.  An exporter’s value function is defined by 
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19 where   is the law of motion for the aggregate state variable  () Μ μ .  The term () 1 δ −  
reflects the probability of exogenous death that the firm faces.  The summation represents 
an expected value calculation where the transition probabilities are included in  , as 
defined in 
Q
(21).   
  A non-exporter must decide whether to remain selling only to the domestic 
market, or to enter the export market.  The non-exporter’s problem can be written as 
  ()
() ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) () ()
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,,, 1 , ,,, ,
,,, m a x
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∑ . (27) 
The two terms in the maximization correspond, respectively, to the expected future profit 
from continuing as a non-exporter and the expected future profit from becoming an 
exporter. This choice is the crucial one for the results presented here.  The small, 
temporary productivity shocks change the future expected profits from exporting little, 
and thus few firms are willing to sink the cost of becoming exporters.  A permanent 
change, such as a tariff decrease, increases a firm’s profit in every realization of η, and 
thus has a larger effect on the expected future profits from exporting.  This larger effect 
induces more firms to enter the export market, and increases the amount of goods being 
traded.  Thus, in this model, permanent changes in tariffs have larger impacts on trade 
than do temporary shocks to productivity.  Solving the non-exporter’s problem yields the 
decision rule over next period’s export status,  ( ) ,,, h d φ κημ , which is equal to 1 if the 
firm chooses to export next period and is equal to 0 if the firm chooses to continue as a 
non-exporter in the next period. 
4.3. Nontraded Good Producers 
The non-traded good,  , is produced by a constant returns to scale firm and is sold in a 
















where the price of good  is  h q hq p .   
20 4.4. Market Clearing 
Goods market clearing conditions are standard.  The labor market clearing condition is 
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The first term on the right hand side is the use of labor for production by non-exporting 
firms, the second is the use of labor for production by exporting firms and the third term 
is the use of labor in exporter entry, some of which is paid by newly created firms.  
Aggregate profits are the sum of gross profits earned by firms minus the costs of entry, 
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The model is closed by assuming that trade is balanced each period, 
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Equilibrium is defined recursively.  For simplicity, only the home country equilibrium 
objects are enumerated; the agents in the foreign country solve problems analogous to 
those in the home country, and have the corresponding decision rules. 
A recursive equilibrium in this economy is value functions,  () ,,, hx V φ κ ημ and 
( ,,, hd V ) φ κημ , decision rules,  ( ) ,,, h d φ κημ ,  ( ) ,,,
h
h l φ κημ ,  () , ,,
f
h l φ κημ , 
() ,,,
h
h p φ κημ , and  ( ,,,
f
h p ) φ κημ , the sets of goods available for consumption 
21 ()
h
h μ Ι and  ()
h
f μ Ι , decision rules  ( ) ,,
h
h c ι ημ for each  ( )
h
h ι μ ∈Ι ,  ( ,,
f
h c ) ι ημ for each 
()
h
f ιμ ∈Ι , and  ( , ) h q ημ , the price function,  ( ) , hq p ημ , and the laws of motion for the 
distribution of firms,  ( , ) hd η μ Μ  and  ( ) , hx η μ Μ , such that these functions satisfy:   
1.  the household’s problem, (19), 
2.  the firm’s problems for each type ( ) , φκ ∈ × FK , (26) and (27), 
3.  the consistency of aggregate and individual decisions,  
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( , ,) , ,, , ,, hd , , , h d 1 hx hx φ κ μ
()
φκημ δ − ν φκ + Φ
) ()
μ + φκημ φκημ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ Μ=              
  and  ( ( ) ( )( ) , 1 ,1 , , , hd , , , hd h d φ κφ −
FK




Μ= ,   
  for  all  () ,  , φκ ∈×
4.  the goods and labor market clearing conditions, 
5.  the balanced trade condition, (31).  
4.6. Equilibrium Properties    
The equilibrium in this economy is characterized by a cut-off rule, φ ημκ
( ˆ ,,
, that is a 
function of the aggregate state and the value of the entry cost.  This is the productivity 
level at which the non-exporting firm with idiosyncratic productivity ) φ ημκ  and entry 
cost   is indifferent between continuing as a non-exporter, and entering the export 
market when the aggregate state is 
κ
( ) , η μ .  The cutoff productivity satisfies   
() ()() () () ( ) ) ˆ , , , , κ κ η μ ⎡⎤
⎣⎦ (
η′ ∑ ˆ , φ η μ κ 1, hx QV η η μ
( ˆ ,,
, , , , hd κ η μ ′′ − , ′ ′
)
V φ η ′ κδ =− μ . (32)     
The right-hand-side of  (32) is the discounted expected future gain from exporting: it is 
the difference in future profits if the firm exports rather than only selling domestically.  
The left-hand-side of (32) is the cost of entering the export market.  Plants with 
productivity below φ ημκ
() ˆ ,,
 sell only to the domestic market, while firms with 
productivity above φ ημκ  sell to both the domestic and the exports markets.  As the 
aggregate state of the economy changes, the expected future profits of the firms change; 
this shifts the cutoff firms, generating the entry and exit of firms in the export market.  It 
22 is easy to show that, for a given ( ) , η μ ,  ˆ φ  is increasing in κ .  That is, the larger is the 
entry cost, the more productive a firm needs to be in order to break even in the export 
market.   
  Plants moving into and out of exporting play the crucial role in explaining the 
different responses of aggregate exports to changes in trade policy and productivity.  If 
the shocks to productivity are small, or not very persistent, there will be little movement 
of firms into or out of exporting.  Thus, productivity shocks induce incumbent exporting 
firms to change prices, and households react to the change in prices by substituting 
according to the elasticity of substitution implied by ρ . This is growth on the intensive 
margin.  With only a few firms entering the export market, extensive margin growth is 
small.  If transitory shocks are the dominant source of the variation measured in time 
series regressions such as Reinert and Roland-Holst (1992) or Blonigen and Wilson 
(1999), they would mostly affect the intensive margin, and the low elasticities estimated 
in these studies would reflect a low true elasticity of substitution.   
A permanent change, such as the lower tariffs that accompany free trade 
agreements, increases the profit from exporting for all realizations of future productivity, 
and thus has a larger impact on the expected future profits from exporting.  The larger 
increase in expected future profits induces some firms that were only selling in the 
domestic market to enter the export market.  These newly traded goods create growth on 
the extensive margin.  These extensive margin effects increase trade flows by more than 
that implied by the fall in tariffs and the elasticity of substitution.  This mechanism 
contributes to the seemingly large estimated elasticities found when regressing trade 
volumes on tariff changes or transportation costs as in Clausing (2001) or Hummels 
(2001). 
In Figure 6 we plot the components of (32): the expected gain from exporting for 
different productivity types and the value of a particular entry cost.  The intersection of 
these two lines defines  ˆ φ : the cutoff productivity for firms with a particular entry cost κ .  
All the firms with productivity less than  ˆ φ  do not export, while firms with productivity 
greater than  ˆ φ  do. To see how the model responds to temporary shocks compared to 
permanent changes, consider two scenarios.  In the first scenario, the economy is subject 
23 to a positive productivity shock.  These shocks are persistent, but not permanent.  In 
response to the shock, the expected future value of exporting shifts up; for any level of 
idiosyncratic productivity, the gain from exporting is larger when productivity is high.  
This shift lowers the cutoff productivity to  ˆ
bc φ  and the firms between  ˆ
bc φ  and  ˆ φ  enter the 
export market.  A typical conditional distribution over firm productivity types is shown in 
Figure 7.  As the cutoff productivity moves to the left, the amount of new firms entering 
can be inferred from the slope of the distribution.  If the slope is steep, the mass of firms 
entering from even a small change in the cutoff productivity can be large.  The slope of 
this distribution near the marginal exporter is a function of the model’s parameters, which 
will be determined in the calibration.  
Now consider subjecting the economy to a permanent decrease in tariffs of the 
same magnitude as the productivity shock.  The permanent change shifts the expected 
future value of exporting up by much more than the persistent, but not permanent, shock.  
The cutoff firm is now  ˆ
tar φ , and the firms between  ˆ
tar φ  and  ˆ φ  begin exporting.  The 
larger shift in expected future profits from exporting from the tariff change leads to a 
greater number of firms beginning to export.  In Figure 7 we can see how the large shift 
in the cutoff productivity leads to a greater number of new entrants than in the case of the 
temporary shock.   
It is the difference in the number of new exporters under the two scenarios that 
changes the implied Armington elasticity.  If no new firms enter the export market in 
response to the productivity shock, households only substitute between the goods already 
being imported and domestically produced goods at the rate σ .  This is trade growth on 
the intensive margin.  In this case, the measured Armington elasticity is exactly  () 11 ρ − .  
If firms enter the export market in response to a change in future profits, trade flows 
increase from the trade of the new exporters as well as the increase in trade of the 
continuing exporters.  If newly traded goods are not accounted for, this extensive margin 
growth shows up in the trade aggregates as intensive margin growth, and the response of 
imports appears very large.  The large response in trade to the change in tariffs results in 
a large estimate of the Armington elasticity.   
24 5. Calibration and Computation 
The model has the ability to generate nonlinear dynamics; the crux of this paper is to 
show that these nonlinearities are large in response to changes in tariffs, but small in 
response to changes in productivity.  To evaluate the size of the nonlinearities in response 
to productivity changes, we require a nonlinear solution method, in particular we will 
discretize the state space and solve the value functions in (26) and (27) using iterative 
methods.     
In order to solve the firms’ problems in (16) and (17), the firms need to know the 
aggregate price index,  , and the consumption of the composite good,  .  These values 
depend on the state variables for this economy, which include the distributions over 
firms, 
h P h C
hd μ  and  hx μ , and their counterparts for the firms in the foreign country.  Due to the 
high dimensionality of these objects, standard computational techniques are not 
applicable.  Rather than take the distributions as state variables, we proceed as in Krusell 
and Smith (1998) by replacing the distribution with a finite dimensional vector of the 
distribution’s moments, m .  We parameterize forecasting functions that predict the future 
aggregate price level, aggregate profits, the foreign wage, and moments of the 
distributions as a function of the current period’s variables.  These functions are 
parameterized by a vector of coefficients, α .   
For a given parameter vector α  we solve the model and use the policy functions 
to generate simulated data, where we solve for the equilibrium prices in each period of 
the simulation.  If the forecasting functions are consistent with the simulated data we 
have arrived at a solution; if not, the vector α  is adjusted and the process is repeated 
until the forecasting functions are consistent with the simulated data that they generate.  
The large number of state variables makes this process computationally intensive and 
many of the simplifications that we have made in the model have been to reduce this 
burden, which is still considerable.  Appendix A provides more details about the 
computation. 
5.1. Calibration 
The model is calibrated to match the United States and a symmetric partner country in 
1987, which is before both the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the NAFTA.  We 
25 choose parameters such that the model’s deterministic steady state displays the key 
aggregate and plant level
3 patterns from the data.  We set the ad valorem tariff rate to be 
5 percent, and choose ρ  to be 0.50, which implies a value of 2.0 for the true elasticity of 
substitution.  This choice of elasticity is in the range found in the time series estimations, 
and is frequently used in the international real business cycle literature. 
The model period is one year, so setting β  equal to 0.96 implies and annual real 
interest rate of about 4.00 percent.  We consider the traded goods sector in the model to 
be manufacturing, even though there is trade in primaries and services.  We exclude 
primaries and services since the plant level data needed to calibrate the model is only 
available for manufacturing plants.  This definition of the tradable goods sector implies 
that γ , the share of expenditures on manufactures, is 0.17.  The parameter governing the 
exogenous death of plants is set so that 2.35 percent of jobs are lost to exiting plants.  
This is the average found in Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) for the years 1973-
1998.  Given the value for δ , the parameter ν —the mass of entrants each period—is 
chosen so that the mass of firms in operation is normalized to one.  The parameters are 
summarized in Table 1. 
The idiosyncratic productivity can take values in the interval [1, ] φ  and the entry 
cost can take values in the interval [ ] 0,κ .  We discretize the interval over productivities 
into 200 different types, and the interval over entry costs into 200 different types, for a 
total of 40,000 firm types.  The shape of the distribution over entrants, Φ, is chosen so 
that the shape of the equilibrium distribution over firm sizes matches that for U.S. 
manufacturing plants.  This requires a joint distribution over ( ) , φ κ .  The unconditional 
probability density function over idiosyncratic productivity is 




−− = . (33) 
In order to reproduce the size distribution of exporting plants, the size of a firm’s export 
entry cost needs to be correlated with the firm’s productivity.  Without correlated entry 
costs, the economy would not have enough small exporting firms.  The prevalence of 
                                                 
3 The data in the Census of Manufacturing is collected at the establishment, or plant, level.  While the 
model presented here has only one-plant firms, this is not true in the data.   
26 small exporters—measured either by employment or sales—is explored in more detail in 
Arkolakis (2007). The distribution of export entry costs, conditional on φ ,  has the form 
  ( )
( ) ( ) 1 g
κκ θφ θφ κφ κ κ
− − =  (34) 
where we allow for correlation by specifying  ( )
2
κ θ φζ ξ φ =+ .  The joint probability 
distribution is built up from  f  and   in the usual way.    g
The remaining parameters,  ,, ,, a n d φ θ ζξφ κ, jointly determine the exporting 
and production structure of the traded goods sector.  We choose these parameters to 
match the trade-output ratio in manufacturing, the employment size distribution of all 
plants in the economy, and the employment size distribution of exporting plants.  To do 
so, we match the share of firms in seven (six independent observations) employee-size 
bins from the U.S. census of manufacturing.  We match the share of firms in three (two 
independent observations) employee-size bins for exporting plants from the census of 
manufacturers.  Fitting the two plant size distributions using so few parameters is 
difficult.  Figure 8 and Figure 9 display the relative success of the calibration.  Both 
figures indicate that the model fits the data fairly well considering the small number of 
free parameters.  More details about the model’s fit can be found in Table 2. 
  The final parameters to specify are the ones governing the exogenous productivity 
shocks.  Aggregate productivity in each country is either 1 ε − , which we denote the low 
shock, or 1 ε + , which we denote the high shock.  Each country has an identical 








Λ= ⎢ ⎥ − ⎣ ⎦
 (35) 
which requires only one parameter, λ .  Assuming that the shocks to productivity in the 
two countries are independent, the process requires calibrating only these two parameters.  
We choose λ  and ε  so that the volatility and persistence of the logged output in the 
model match those in the U.S. data.  The persistence of logged output is measured as the 
one period autocorrelation, and we impose that one country’s productivity does not have 
any “spillover” effects on the other country’s productivity.  We choose λ  and ε  so that 
27 the one period autocorrelation of output is 0.79, and the standard deviation is 0.036, the 
values for logged, linearly detrended, annual U.S. data from 1950-2000. 
6. Model Results 
In Section 4 we saw that qualitatively the model has different implications for temporary 
and permanent changes to exporting profitability, and that these different responses could 
lead to different estimates of the Armington elasticity.  We now use the calibrated model 
to see if the exporting entry costs can quantitatively account for the different estimates of 
the Armington elasticity found in the literature. 
6.1. Business Cycle Estimates  
To see if the model can account for the low estimates derived from the high-frequency 
data, we use the model to generate simulated time series data on the prices and quantities 
of domestic goods and imports. To accurately test the model we must construct measures 
from the simulated data that are consistent with the methods used in the empirical works 
cited above.  To do so, we construct a Laspeyres price index for imports, as in Reinert 
and Roland-Holst (1992), which weights period   prices by the quantities imported in a 
chosen base period, 
t























.      ( 3 6 )  
where  ,0
h
f Ι  is the set of goods traded in the base period,  0 t = .
4  A similar Laspeyres 
index for domestic consumption is constructed, and these indices are used to deflate 
expenditures on imports and domestically produced goods.  The data are used to estimate 
the Armington elasticity using a specification similar to that found in the empirical 
literature, 
  () ( ) 1, , , 1, , , ˆˆ log log
hh h h
t t ft h t t t h t ft t CC PP α σ −− ε Δ =+Δ +. (37) 
                                                 
4 In both the computational model and the data, there are only a finite number of goods being traded, so the 
formulas expressed in this section are also written in terms of a finite number of goods.  The counterparts to 
these formulas for the model presented in Section 4, which features a continuum of goods, are the same 
except the summations are replaced by integrals.   
 
28   We simulate 250 economies, each for a 300 periods.  After discarding the first 50 
periods, we construct price indices as specified above, choosing period 51 to be the base 
year.  We fit the equation in (37) to the data from each simulation.  The mean value of the 
elasticity, σ , is 1.21 and the mean value of the constant, α , is  .  A histogram of 
the elasticities from the simulations is plotted in Figure 10.  The parameters are precisely 
estimated, and the average r-squared for the regressions is 0.56.  This estimate fits well 
into the range of values estimated from time series data.  As surveyed above, the time 
series estimates range from 0.2 to 3.5, with an average of about 1.0, a little lower than the 
elasticity estimated from the model.  Our estimate is also in line with the values used in 
the international business cycle literature; these studies commonly use Armington 
elasticities between 1.0 and 2.0.   
4 1.4 10
− ×
In interpreting the results, it is important to notice that the estimated elasticity is 
about 40 percent smaller than the true elasticity.  In equilibrium, the household’s first 
order conditions must hold with equality, which implies that the regression in (37) should 
fit exactly, and the elasticity of substitution should be measured as 2.0.  The equation 
estimated with the Laspeyres price indices, however, does not fit exactly because the 
price index is not accounting for the changing set of goods being traded.  Not taking into 
account the changing set of goods results in significant measurement error and a lower 
estimated value for the Armington elasticity.   
Decomposing the price index exposes the source of the measurement error.  Using 
the expression for prices in (18), the price index in (26) can be written as 
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This splits the index into two parts.  The first term on the right-hand side is the ratio of 
the wage and the aggregate productivity.  This term is common to all firms, so we denote 
it the aggregate component. The second term depends on the set of goods being 
imported, so we denote it the composition component.  Note that the set of goods over 
which the index is computed is held fixed through time.  As a practical matter, goods that 
become traded subsequent to the base year must be ignored: the quantities imported of 
29 “newly traded” goods are by definition zero in the base year
5.  This formulation implies 
that any change in the composition of goods being imported will not be reflected in the 
price index.  
  In contrast to the Laspeyres index, the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
price index makes adjustments for the set of goods being traded.  This index is exactly 
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. (39) 
The summation in this index runs over all the goods being imported, incorporating the 
changing composition of goods.  The domestic price index can similarly be defined.  If 
we were to run the regression specified in (27) using the CES indices that account for the 
changing composition of imports, we would find the estimated elasticity is exactly 2.0.  
As with the Laspeyres index, the CES price index can be split into an aggregate 
component and a composition component.  The aggregate component is identical across 
the two indices.  In contrast to the Laspeyres index, the composition component in the 
CES index changes as the set of goods being imported changes.  As more goods are 
imported, this term decreases, lowering the price index.  When goods exit the import 
market, the price index increases.  The divergence of the composition component in these 
two indices is the source of the measurement error.  This kind of measurement error has 
been noted by Helkie and Hooper (1988), Krugman (1989), Feenstra (1994) and Feenstra 
and Shiells (1997) in the context of income elasticity estimates.  They argued that the 
growing number of goods being imported by the U.S. is not reflected in the import price 
index, so the new imports lead to an increase in the value of imports but not in the price 
index.  The rising value of imports is then attributed to the growth in U.S. income, 
implying a large value for the income elasticity of imports.  Broda and Weinstein (2006) 
extended the methodology in Feenstra (1994) to create a price index for U.S. imports that 
                                                 
5 If the price index is “rebased,” the set of goods over which the index is defined would change to reflect 
the mix of goods available in the new base period.  If the new price index was ratio-spliced onto the old 
index, this would not change our findings, as the rebasing would only have an affect on the level of the 
index and not the volatility. 
30 corrects for the appearance of new varieties.  They calculate a 28 percent upward bias in 
the traditionally measured price of imports.  In our model, goods both enter and exit the 
import market, and both situations lead to bias in the measurement of prices.   
The difference between the two indices can be seen in Figure 11, where we plot the 
price indices for a particular simulation.  The Laspeyres index, whose composition 
component is constant, tracks  f f wz .  For most periods, the CES index moves similarly 
to the Laspeyres index, reflecting the small number of foreign firms entering and exiting 
the export market.  The difference between the two is most apparent when both the home 
country and the foreign country have low productivity.  Foreign firm export profits are 
lowest in this state: low foreign country productivity makes production more costly, and 
low home country productivity decreases home country income.  When the marginal 
exporting firms die off, they are replaced by firms that do not enter the export market.  
When both countries have low aggregate productivity, the Laspeyres index increases, but 
the CES index increase more, as it factors in the decreasing number of imported varieties.  
The correlation coefficient between these two indices is 0.53. The imperfect correlation 
between the two price indices drives the difference in the estimated elasticities.      
6.2. Trade Liberalization 
To see if the model can generate the large response to changes in tariffs, we consider the 
complete removal of the 5 percent tariff in the baseline model.  To capture this idea, we 
compute the equilibrium under the 5 percent tariff and then compute the equilibrium in 
the absence of tariffs.  By proceeding in this way, we avoid having to compute the 
transition path from the high tariff equilibrium to the low tariff equilibrium.  The 
transition path between tariff policies is certainly interesting from the point of view of 
welfare analysis, but is very difficult to compute in this model
6.  The results of the 
decrease in tariffs are dramatic.  As can be seen in the first column of Table 3, the decline 
in tariffs leads to 23.39 percent increase in exports.  The ratio of imports to domestic 
consumption grows by 30.01 percent as a result of the tariff decrease.  Measuring the 
Armington elasticity with respect to the 5 percentage point tariff change yields an 
                                                 
6 For an analysis of transition paths without aggregate uncertainty, but with idiosyncratic uncertainty, see 
Alessandria and Choi (2007b). 
31 elasticity of 6.38, which is more than 5 times the elasticity estimated from the time series 
data.  This value is in the middle of the range of values reported in Hummels (2001), 
whose estimates range from about 3 to 8, with an average of 5.6.  Our estimate also falls 
into the range estimated in Romalis (2007), which finds elasticities typically between 4 
and 13.  The estimates in Clausing (2001) and Head and Ries (2001), who study the 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, range from 8 to 11.  Though the value of 6.38 found 
here is lower than their findings, our simple model has abstracted from other possibly 
important elements such as returns to scale, intermediate good trade, or capital 
accumulation. 
The five-fold difference between the time series estimate of the Armington 
elasticity and the elasticity implied by trade liberalization is driven by the growth in trade 
on the extensive margin.  Table 3 displays the results of trade liberalization in two 
different models: the baseline model specified in Sections 4 and 5, and a model identical 
to the baseline model except that the entry costs have been set to zero for all firms.  The 
model without entry costs has the obvious counterfactual implication that all firms 
export.  Given this characteristic of the model, modify the household’s preferences to 
include a home bias parameter, ω , as in (4).  We choose ω  so that the country still only 
exports 9.1 percent of output when tariffs are 5 percent.  The rest of the model is 
calibrated as in Section 5, although we no longer have to choose the maximum value of 
the entry cost or the shape parameters for the distribution over entry costs.  The effects of 
trade liberalization in the two models are drastically different.  Eliminating a 5 percent 
tariff in the baseline model increases exports by 23.39 percent, while exports increase by 
only 7.32 percent in the model without entry costs.  The extra 16.07 percentage points of 
growth in exports are due to the new exporters that enter the market following the 
decrease in tariffs.  The model without entry costs has no extensive margin; all the firms 
are already exporting.  The increase in trade is driven by the lower delivered price that 
results from the elimination of the tariff.  The baseline model, however, has substantial 
extensive margin growth; 2.23 percent more firms export following the elimination of the 
tariff.  The extra trade generated by the new exporters, along with the intensive margin 
trade, drive up the ratio of imports to domestic consumption by 30.42 percent; a value 
3.17 times larger than the change in the model without entry costs.  This increase implies 
32 an Armington elasticity of 6.38 compared to the measured elasticity of 2.01 in the model 
without entry costs.  
7. Conclusion 
Models in which countries trade differentiated goods depend crucially on the Armington 
elasticity to determine both the short run and the long run behavior of trade flows and 
prices.  Models that were built to explain high frequency fluctuations, such as those in the 
IRBC literature, need small values of the Armington elasticity, while applied GE models 
need large elasticities to match the increase in trade following trade liberalization.   
Econometric estimates support this dichotomy:  estimates derived from high-frequency 
time series data are low, and range between 0.2 and 3.5, while estimates gleaned from 
trade liberalizations range from 4 to 15.  This paper reconciles these two observations by 
recognizing that the sources of variation in the two approaches are different.  The high-
frequency variation in the time series studies is caused by small and persistent, but not 
permanent, shocks to productivity or demand.  Trade liberalization, however, is typically 
a permanent change.  When agents react differently to temporary and permanent changes, 
the measured elasticities will differ.   
  We build a model that incorporates elements from the international real business 
cycle literature and the applied GE models that are commonly used to study trade policy.  
The key feature of the model is that firms face a cost of entering the export market, as 
well as uncertainty about future profits from exporting.  Temporary shocks will induce 
few firms to change export status and incumbent exporters respond to the shocks by 
changing prices.  Measuring the elasticity with respect to these changes will recover the 
low elasticity implied by the model’s parameters.  A permanent tariff change increases 
the future value of exporting in all states, and induces a larger number of firms to begin 
exporting.  When the trade from these newly imported goods is not properly accounted 
for, the response of trade to small changes in tariffs looks large, implying a high 
Armington elasticity.  The calibrated model, with a “true” elasticity of substitution of 2.0, 
is capable of producing time series estimates of the Armington elasticity of about 1.21, 
while the elasticity in response to a reduction in tariffs is 6.38.  The initial success of this 
33 model adds to the growing evidence that studying firm level choices can lead to a greater 
understanding of international trade.  
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38 Appendix 1  
Computational Algorithm 
The state space of the model is made up of two continuous variables, φ  and  , two 
distributions, 
κ
hx μ and  fx μ , and one discrete variable, η .  The two continuous variables 
are discretized as {}  and { 1
I




= and the distribution over these variables is  () ij f , φ κ .   
The model is difficult to compute because the state variables  hx μ  and  fx μ —the 
distributions over exporting firms—are infinite dimensional objects.  To deal with this 
problem, we solve the model using the technique described in Krusell and Smith (1998), 
which replaces the distribution with a finite dimensional vector of the distribution’s 
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where the function   is equal to one if a firm of type  d ( ) , ij φ κ  in aggregate state 
(
* ,, n mm ) η  is an exporter and equal to zero otherwise.   
We need to forecast 4 objects: aggregate profits, the aggregate price index, the 
wage in the foreign country and the moment  :    m
() () () ( )
**
12 3 log , , log log 1,...,4 nn n n mm m m n ηα α α
ΠΠ Π Π= + + =  
() () () ( )
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12 3 log , , log log 1,...,4
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To characterize the forecasting function of a variable, we need to specify 3 parameters 
per value of the exogenous state variable η .  Denote the vector containing all 48 of the 
parameters α . 
 
The algorithm proceeds iteratively; let sdenote the iteration.  We begin by choosing 
initial values for α , and a set of grid points for  ,  m φ , and κ .  The algorithm for solving 
the model is:  
39 1.  Given 
s α  and the functional forms of the forecasting functions, solve for the exporter 
and non-exporter value functions and the export decision rules using value function 
iteration.  When the forecasting function for m′yields a value that is not a grid point, 
use bilinear interpolation in the m  and 
* m  dimensions. 
2.  Simulate the economy for 3000 periods using the export decision rules found in step 
1, but computing equilibrium prices in each period.  This produces a series of data: 
{ }
0,...,3000 ,,, ht ht ft ht t Pwm
= Π . 
3.  To ensure no dependence on initial conditions, discard the first 500 observations.  
Using the simulated data, find new values of α , 
1 s α
+ , by ordinary least squares. 
4.  If the maximum change between the elements of 
s α  and 
1 s α
+  is less than 
5 10
− stop.  
If not, repeat steps 2 through 4 until α converges.  
 
Forecasting Function Values 
Coefficient  P   Π  m′  f w  
  1 α ,    () , HH η = -1.446   -2.314    -1.513    0.000   
  2 α ,    () , HH η = -0.006   0.037    0.031    -0.330   
  3 α ,    () , HH η = -0.011   -0.008    0.184    0.330   
  1 α ,    () , HL η = -1.445   -2.313    -1.562    -0.032   
  2 α ,    () , HL η = -0.006   0.036    0.049    -0.330   
  3 α ,    () , HL η = -0.011   -0.006    0.140    0.331   
  1 α ,    () , LH η = -1.396   -2.369    -0.228    0.032   
  2 α ,    () , LH η = -0.006   0.001    0.883    -0.331   
  3 α ,    () , LH η = -0.012   0.000    0.004    0.330   
  1 α ,    () , LL η = -1.395   -2.370    -0.190    0.000   
  2 α ,  () , L L η =   -0.006   0.000    0.891    -0.331   
  3 α ,  () , L L η =   -0.011   -0.001    0.016    0.331   
SST 1.24E-4    3.61E-7    0.381    0.128   
2 R   0.999   0.819    0.999    0.999   
40  
Table 1 
Calibration:  0.05, 0.50 τ ρ = =  
 
Parameter Value  Data 
β   0.961  Annual real interest rate (4.0%) 
δ   0.094  Share of employment lost to plant closure (0.094) 
γ   0.171  Share of manufacturing in total production (0.171) 
ε   0.025  Standard deviation of log-output (0.036) 





Jointly Determined Parameters 
 
Parameter    All Establishments   
   Employees    Share of Establishments   
       Data   Model  
   1-20     0.657    0.645   
   21-50     0.162    0.172   
0.672 θ =     51-100     0.080    0.078   
134.4 φ =     101-250     0.085    0.062   
   251-500     0.022    0.029   
   501-1000     0.009    0.011   
   >1001     0.005    0.003   
   SSE        0.001   
              
   Exporting Establishments   
   Employees    Share of Establishments   
       Data   Model  
   1-100    0.771    0.771   
  0.190 ζ =−   101-500    0.182    0.182   
  0.0009 ξ =   >500    0.047    0.047   
  10.00 κ =     SSE        0.000   




Response to Permanent Removal of 5% Tariff 
 
Variable  
Entry Costs Model 
(% change) 
No Entry Costs Model 
(% change) 
Exports   23.39    7.32   
Imports Dom. Consumption   30.42   9.57   
Exporting Plants  2.23    0.00   
Implied σ   6.38   2.01   
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43 Figure 3 
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44 Figure 5 
 
 
( ) , d μ φκ  measure of non-exporters of type ( ) , φ κ   
( , x ) μ φκ  measure of exporters of type ( ) , φ κ  
 
 







d μ ′  stay: non-exporter 
switch: exporter
x μ ′  x μ   death   stay: exporter 
45 Figure 6 
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